Slotting Allowances, Failure Fees and Asymmetric Information in the Grocery Supply Chain

Mechanism design framework and two moments of the product demand distribution are utilized to eliminate mean-variance dominated products and separate non-dominated products by their demand distributions. Model results suggest that accurately designed menus of contracts including retail prices, slotting allowances, failure fees (or success rebates) and sales targets can separate products by their demand distributions and alleviate asymmetric information problems. Adverse selection problems can be reduced by utilizing such mechanisms to align incentives for retailers and manufacturers when shelving new product introductions.

Name thesis:degree_name

Ph.D.

Level thesis:degree_level

Dissertation

Discipline thesis:degree_discipline

Agricultural Economics

Grantor

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Year dc:date

2015

Author dc:creator

• DeVuyst, Cheryl Sinn

Contributors dc:contributor

• Randall Westgren

• Economics, Agricultural

Language dc:language

eng

Identifier

(MiAaPQ)AAI9955606

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/83048