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University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Credit-Output Interlinked Contracts: The Relationships Between Traders and Farmers
Abstract
dc:descriptionWithin the repeated game framework, changes in the length of the review period, the farmer's probability of success, the reservation utilities of the parties, and their risk aversion are analyzed. In general, these changes affect the system of incentives designed to promote contract compliance, and therefore, the behavior of the parties and the conditions of the contracts.
Degree
thesis:*- Name thesis:degree_name
- Ph.D.
- Level thesis:degree_level
- Dissertation
- Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
- Agricultural Economics
- Grantor
- University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
- Year dc:date
- 2015
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Author dc:creator
-
- Sotomayor, Narda Lizette
- Contributors dc:contributor
-
- Nelson, Charles H.
Subjects
dc:subject × 1Rights
- Language dc:language
- eng
Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Identifier
- (MiAaPQ)AAI9912383
- OAI identifier oai:identifier
- oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/83026