Ambient Air Pollution and the Allocation of Environmental Enforcement Effort

In this dissertation, I show that transboundary pollution and penalties for noncompliance generate incentives for strategic behavior by state enforcement agencies: laxness in enforcement of polluting plants with higher potential to generate spillovers in the former and precautionary behavior which leads to non-monotonic enforcement in the latter. These findings help to explain, in part, why inspection rates are lower in heavily polluted areas than in areas with ambient pollution concentrations closer to the nonattainment threshold.

Name thesis:degree_name

Ph.D.

Level thesis:degree_level

Dissertation

Discipline thesis:degree_discipline

Agricultural and Consumer Economics

Grantor

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Year dc:date

2015

Author dc:creator

• Rabassa, Mariano J.

Contributors dc:contributor

• Brozović, Nicholas

• Sociology, Criminology and Penology

Language dc:language

eng

Identifier

(MiAaPQ)AAI3314868

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/83001