Trustworthy History and Provenance for Files and Databases

In this dissertation, we explore techniques for providing integrity assurances for the history of data in an untrusted environment. We show that it is possible to provide strong integrity assurances for data history, without incurring high performance overheads, or using costly trusted hardware. We first focus on file systems and data provenance, and develop provably-secure schemes for securing file provenance information. With empirical evaluation using realistic file system workloads, we show that our scheme has low overhead, and can be deployed with minimal changes to existing applications. Next, we investigate history integrity in database systems. We develop an efficient, low-overhead architecture for making databases tamper-evident, and provide audit optimizations that make audits very fast. Finally, we examine legal requirements for database integrity, develop a trustworthy and verifiable vacuuming scheme for databases, and show how to define and implement enforcement of subpoenas on database content that is relevant to litigation.

Name thesis:degree_name

Ph.D.

Level thesis:degree_level

Dissertation

Discipline thesis:degree_discipline

Computer Science

Grantor

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Year dc:date

2015

Author dc:creator

• Hasan, Ragib

Contributors dc:contributor

• Winslett, Marianne

• Computer Science

Language dc:language

eng

Identifier

(MiAaPQ)AAI3392062

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/81859