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University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Commitment in Labor and Credit Contracts With Asymmetric Information, Bankruptcy and Extensive Form Gaming

Abstract

dc:description

This thesis investigates the effects of worker mobility and renegotiation on a firm's contracts for labor and credit, when information is asymmetric and the firm is subject to limited liability. These effects are analyzed in two chapters. The first chapter analyzes the contracts with commitment (that is, when renegotiation is not possible). The second chapter analyzes the contracts without commitment.

Degree

thesis:*
Name thesis:degree_name
Ph.D.
Level thesis:degree_level
Dissertation
Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
Economics
Grantor
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Year dc:date
2014

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Tsoulouhas, Theofanis C.
Contributors dc:contributor
  • Kahn, Charles M.

Subjects

dc:subject × 1

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Identifier
(UMI)AAI9411804
OAI identifier oai:identifier
oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/72427

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
University of Illinois - Urbana-Champaign
Base URL
www.ideals.illinois.edu/oai-pmh
Last updated
2026-07-22
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Tsoulouhas, Theofanis C.. Commitment in Labor and Credit Contracts With Asymmetric Information, Bankruptcy and Extensive Form Gaming. Dissertation thesis, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/2142/72427