Abstract
dc:descriptionThe first essay examines the outcome of an ascending-price multiple-object auction. Two bidders with continuous, convex demand functions participate in the auction of a certain number of divisible objects. The auctioneer starts the process by announcing an initial price and by asking both bidders to submit sealed-bids (desired amounts). The auctioneer keeps increasing the price until the total amount of bids is less than the total supply. This mechanism has been used to sell stocks of government owned companies under the Brazilian Privatization Program. We compute the outcome of this auction game under full information and conclude that this mechanism has perverse effects in terms of revenue maximization.
Degree
thesis:*- Name thesis:degree_name
- Ph.D.
- Level thesis:degree_level
- Dissertation
- Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
- Economics
- Grantor
- University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
- Year dc:date
- 2014
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Author dc:creator
-
- Menezes, Flavio Marques
- Contributors dc:contributor
-
- Kahn, C.M.,
Subjects
dc:subject × 1Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Identifier
- (UMI)AAI9329112
- OAI identifier oai:identifier
- oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/72422