Disclosure Timing of Accounting Information and Stock Market Reaction Under Asymmetric Information

This study explores a new aspect of timely reporting in a capital market where there is information asymmetry about firm quality between investors and managers. Timely reporting can be valuable to managers in that it can be used as a signal of firm quality. The study also offers a theoretical model which suggests an explanation for why some firms disclose their earnings reports earlier than do other firms. What differentiates this study from previous analytical studies is that the timing of mandatory earnings announcements is analyzed from a signaling perspective. The analysis is based on the conjecture that disclosure timing itself may have information content independent of the news type.

Name thesis:degree_name

Ph.D.

Level thesis:degree_level

Dissertation

Discipline thesis:degree_discipline

Accountancy

Grantor

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Year dc:date

2014

Author dc:creator

• Suh, Chung Woo

Contributors dc:contributor

• Kwon, Young K.

• Business Administration, Accounting

Identifier

(UMI)AAI8823263

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/71412