Government Behavior in Collective Bargaining: A Test for Self-Interested Bureaucrats

The goals of government in the collective bargaining process do not appear as simple as those in the private sector. One can make a reasonable case that firms in the private sector are trying to maximize profits. The question then arises as to what government agencies are attempting to do when they enter into negotiations with their unionized employees. The dominant view is that the government is simply serving the needs of its constituents. An alternative view is that government bureaucrats pursue their own interests and are not simply acting on behalf of their constituents. This thesis attempts to distinguish the behavior arising from these different motivations.

Name thesis:degree_name

Ph.D.

Level thesis:degree_level

Dissertation

Discipline thesis:degree_discipline

Economics

Grantor

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Year dc:date

2014

Author dc:creator

• O'Brien, Kevin Michael

Contributors dc:contributor

• Brueckner, Jan K.

• Economics, General
• Economics, Labor

Identifier

(UMI)AAI8908793

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/70807