Optimal Contracts for Legal Services

This dissertation characterizes optimal contracts for legal services in the presence of asymmetric information. The lawyer-client relationship examined is an application of the general principal-agent problem. The agent (lawyer) takes an action that, together with the realization of a random variable (merit), determines the outcome of the case (settlement value). The merit of the case refers to the actual facts present in the client's case and how they relate to the relevant case law. A conflict of interest arises because the action is a productive input that involves disutility to the lawyer.

Name thesis:degree_name

Ph.D.

Level thesis:degree_level

Dissertation

Discipline thesis:degree_discipline

Economics

Grantor

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Year dc:date

2014

Author dc:creator

• Woj, Carolyn Anne

• Economics, General

Identifier

(UMI)AAI8803238

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/70794