Hospital Competition and Physician Prices (Economics, Health Care)

This study investigates the relationship between physicians and hospitals. Physicians are modeled as purchasing hospital affiliation. The affiliation fee is in the form of donated services, restrictions on physician behavior and other means by which the physician is made to bear hospital costs. The affiliation fee increases as the hospital's quality increases. Perfectly competitive physicians offer consumers a bundled good of office and hospital characteristics. There is a market clearing hedonic price function which relates physician attributes to price. Physicians affiliate with that hospital which offers the physician his/her profit maximizing combination of affiliation fee and hospital characteristics. Competition among hospitals reduces the affiliation fee and increases hospital characteristics. This allows physicians to lower their prices, inducing consumers to enter the market which results in higher physician density.

Name thesis:degree_name

Ph.D.

Level thesis:degree_level

Dissertation

Discipline thesis:degree_discipline

Economics

Grantor

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Year dc:date

1984

Author dc:creator

• Custer, William Sanders

• Economics, General

Identifier

(UMI)AAI8422047

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/70745