Impression Formation: The Relation Between Recall and Judgment

One aspect of person perception research that has posed problems for many theories is that there is often little correspondence between judgments that are made about a person and specific facts that can be recalled about that person. Lichtenstein and Srull (1987) have proposed a model that suggests that this type of low correspondence is to be expected whenever evaluations of the person are spontaneously formed at the time the relevant information is acquired. However, a relatively strong correspondence between the judgments that are made and the information that is recalled is expected when such evaluations are not spontaneously formed at the time of information acquisition. They argue that a person's processing objectives or goals are a critical mediating variable that determines the nature of the relationship between recall and judgment. The three experiments reported were designed to further extend the model proposed by Lichtenstein and Srull. Several phenomena are reported that highlight the differences observed as a function of processing objectives. These differences include: a strong correlation between recall and judgment under comprehension set conditions but not under impression set conditions, higher levels of recall under impression set conditions than under comprehension set conditions, and longer judgment reaction times under impression set conditions than under comprehension set conditions. These and other phenomena provide evidence in support of the model proposed by Lichtenstein and Srull, as conceptualized as a two-stage theory of decision making.

Name thesis:degree_name

Ph.D.

Level thesis:degree_level

Dissertation

Discipline thesis:degree_discipline

Psychology

Grantor

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Year dc:date

2014

Author dc:creator

• Lichtenstein, Meryl

• Psychology, Experimental

Identifier

(UMI)AAI8803116

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/69702