Incentive Control Strategies for Decision Problems With Parametric Uncertainties (Large Scale Systems, Game Theory, Stochastic, Coordination, Sensitivity Analysis)

The central theme of this thesis is the design of incentive control policies in large scale systems with hierarchical decision structures, under the stipulation that the objective functionals of the agents at the lower level of the hierarchy are uncertain to the top-level controller (the leader). These uncertainties are modeled as a finite-dimensional parameter vector whose exact value constitutes private information to the relevant agent at the lower level. The approach we have adopted is to design incentive policies for the leader such that the dependence of the decision of the agents on the uncertain parameter is minimized. We have identified several classes of problems for which this approach is feasible. In particular, we have constructed policies whose performance is arbitrarily close to the solution of a version of the same problem that does not involve uncertainties. We have also shown that for a certain class of problem wherein the leader observes a linear combination of the agents' decisions, the leader can achieve the performance he would obtain if he had observed each decision separately.

Name thesis:degree_name

Ph.D.

Level thesis:degree_level

Dissertation

Discipline thesis:degree_discipline

Electrical Engineering

Grantor

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Year dc:date

2014

Author dc:creator

• Cansever, Derya H.

• Physics, Electricity and Magnetism

Identifier

(UMI)AAI8600138

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/69312