Modality and Logical Form

The logical form of an alethic modal judgement is given in part by a characterization of the semantic role of a modal qualification. Otherwise, a "formal" account of modality lacks the requisite degree of explanatory power. Explaining generally the semantic role of a modal qualification is significantly different from giving a truth theory for constructions of a standard logical grammar of truth functions and first-order quantification. For the purpose of explaining distinctive logical traits of our modal idiom, it is not enough to generalize familiar model-theoretic methods of defining a truth predicate for intensional languages. That semantic strategy abstracts from the operation of certain communicative constraints on the interaction of verbal forms and semantic values which is characteristic of modal talk. Our intuitive assessments of modal judgements do not make sense when that aspect is ignored.

Name thesis:degree_name

Ph.D.

Level thesis:degree_level

Dissertation

Discipline thesis:degree_discipline

Philosophy

Grantor

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Year dc:date

2014

Author dc:creator

• Riggs, Donald Royal

• Philosophy

Language dc:language

eng

Identifier

(UMI)AAI8108639

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/68408