Secure protocols for wireless availability

Since wireless networks share a communication medium, multiple transmissions on the same channel cause interference to each other and degrade the channel quality, much as multiple people talking at the same time make for inefficient meetings. To avoid transmission collision, the network divides the medium into multiple orthogonal channels (by interleaving the channel access in frequency or time) and often uses medium access control (MAC) to coordinate channel use. Alternatively (e.g., when the wireless users use the same physical channel), the network users can emulate such orthogonal channel access in processing by spreading and coding the signal. Building on such orthogonal access technology, this dissertation studies protocols that support the coexistence of wireless users and ensure wireless availability. In contrast to other studies focusing on improving the overall e fficiency of the network, I aim to achieve reliability at all times. Thus, to study the worst-case misbehavior, I pose the problem within a security framework and introduce an adversary who compromised the network and has insider access. In this dissertation, I propose three schemes for wireless availability: SimpleMAC, Ignore-False-Reservation MAC (IFR-MAC), and Redundancy O ffset Narrow Spectrum (RONS). SimpleMAC and IFR-MAC build on MAC protocols that utilize explicit channel coordination in control communication. SimpleMAC counters MAC-aware adversary that uses the information being exchanged at the MAC layer to perform a more power e fficient jamming attack. IFR-MAC nulli ffies the proactive attack of denial-of-service injection of false reservation control messages. Both SimpleMAC and IFR-MAC quickly outperform the Nash equilibrium of disabling MAC and converge to the capacity-optimal performance in worst-case failures. When the MAC fails to coordinate channel use for orthogonal access or in a single-channel setting (both cases of which, the attacker knows the exact frequency and time location of the victim's channel access), RONS introduces a physical-layer, processing-based technique for interference mitigation. RONS is a narrow spectrum technology that bypasses the spreading cost and eff ectively counters the attacker's information-theoretically optimal strategy of correlated jamming.

Name thesis:degree_name

Ph.D.

Level thesis:degree_level

Dissertation

Discipline thesis:degree_discipline

Electrical & Computer Engr

Grantor

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Year dc:date

2013

Author dc:creator

• Chang, Sang-Yoon

Contributors dc:contributor

• Hu, Yih-Chun
• Vaidya, Nitin H.
• Borisov, Nikita
• Gunter, Carl A.

• Physical layer
• Jamming
• Interference
• Channel capacity
• Wireless
• Security
• Medium access control

Statement dc:rights

• Copyright 2013 Sang-Yoon Chang

Language dc:language

en

Handle dc:identifier

http://hdl.handle.net/2142/45414

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/45414