Requirements for keyless jamming mitigation

One of the primary advantages of spread spectrum communication is its resistance to interference and jamming. However, it has the drawback of requiring the pre-establishment of a secret code between sender and receiver. This requirement can lead to scaling and security issues, especially in a broadcast setting; as a result, several “uncoordinated” approaches have been proposed that do not require a pre-established secret code. In this thesis, we examine the underlying assumptions of these approaches and their resource requirements. In particular, we develop the model of a reactive jammer, parameterize it with varying levels of ability, and use this model to analyze three proposed keyless jamming mitigation techniques. We show that many of the uncoordinated spread spectrum schemes are infeasible for realistic computational powers and allocations of bandwidth even if the attacker simply uses commercial-off-the-shelf equipment. We also show that the third scheme, BBC codes, is vulnerable to a mark-cancellation-and-insertion attack. In particular, we show how an attacker can use multiple sinusoids to “search” for a cancellation signal over the space of phase and channel condition. We also propose modifications to improve the BBC codes, which can provide more robust jamming resistance with plausible system bandwidth requirements.

Name thesis:degree_name

M.S.

Level thesis:degree_level

Thesis

Discipline thesis:degree_discipline

Electrical & Computer Engr

Grantor

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Year dc:date

2012

Author dc:creator

• Esteki, Danesh

Contributors dc:contributor

• Hu, Yih-Chun

• Jamming Mitigation

Statement dc:rights

• Copyright 2011 Danesh Esteki

Language dc:language

en

Handle dc:identifier

http://hdl.handle.net/2142/29730

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/29730