Interpretive experimentalism: A pragmatic theory of moral norms and judgment

Recently, some philosophers working in applied moral philosophy have concluded that the received rule-based normative theories (such as Kantianism and utilitarianism) are inadequate guides for deliberation about concrete moral problems for at least two reasons. First, such problems seem to involve heterogeneous considerations whose normative import can only be assessed in light of attention to the particular circumstances that occasion moral doubt and conflict. Second, moral norms seem to be subject to re-interpretation and modification as a result of reflection on moral problems. Thus, some argue that the concern in moral deliberation should be with interpreting the relevant particulars of cases, not attempting to deduce judgments from some fixed principle or procedure. One might think that focus on particular cases is tantamount to the rejection of normative theory. Resisting that conclusion, this dissertation develops a theory of moral norms and judgment that accounts for the primacy of the interpretive nature of moral judgment and the mutability of moral norms. The core idea of the theory is that we should conceive of moral norms as concrete socio-psychological entities. Like other kinds of practical knowledge, moral norms arise out of problem-solving events and are modifiable during the course of their use.

Name thesis:degree_name

Ph.D.

Level thesis:degree_level

Dissertation

Discipline thesis:degree_discipline

Philosophy

Grantor

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Year dc:date

2011

Author dc:creator

• Lekan, Todd Michael

Contributors dc:contributor

• Schacht, Richard L.

• Philosophy

Statement dc:rights

• Copyright 1996 Lekan, Todd Michael

Language dc:language

eng

Identifier

9780591198799
AAI9712347
(UMI)AAI9712347

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/23789