Market and bargaining approaches to nonpoint source pollution abatement problems

This research focuses upon the use of market incentives for environmental protection, with specific reference to nonpoint source pollution from agricultural land. The case when polluters contribute recursively rather than additively to environmental damages is investigated. While an optimal solution is theoretically possible, there exist opportunities for strategic behavior. Hence, bargaining solutions under imperfect information are analyzed. From this analysis, it is concluded that the presence of imperfect information will not distort the level of discharges from the socially desirable quantity provided contracts between landowners are correctly specified.

Name thesis:degree_name

Ph.D.

Level thesis:degree_level

Dissertation

Discipline thesis:degree_discipline

Economics

Grantor

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Year dc:date

2011

Author dc:creator

• Netusil, Noelwah Rose

Contributors dc:contributor

• Braden, John B.

• Economics, Agricultural
• Economics, General

Statement dc:rights

• Copyright 1992 Netusil, Noelwah Rose

Language dc:language

eng

Identifier

AAI9305633
(UMI)AAI9305633

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/22433