Re-examining the Cartesian mind: Dispelling a myth

"Many contemporary philosophers of mind regard the Cartesian theory of the mental as the major stumbling block to any viable theory of either mental representation or consciousness. Accordingly, they take part of their task to be the undoing of the Cartesianism that infects our thinking about the mental. In The Concept of Mind, for example, Ryle portrayed Descartes as positing a nonphysical ""place"" where mental events and processes resided. Psychological states were taken to be private, internal objects to which we had access by a special kind of perceptual process, namely, introspection. Following Ryle, Dennett and Kenny see the Cartesian view as the primary obstacle to a correct understanding of the nature of mind. They, too, regard Descartes as committed to a model of internal perception. Furthermore, most contemporary philosophers take the Cartesian view to engender an inappropriate dichotomy between the content and the quality of perceptual states."

Name thesis:degree_name

Ph.D.

Level thesis:degree_level

Dissertation

Discipline thesis:degree_discipline

Philosophy

Grantor

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Year dc:date

2011

Author dc:creator

• Kendrick, Nancy Ellen

Contributors dc:contributor

• Akins, Kathleen

• Philosophy

Statement dc:rights

• Copyright 1994 Kendrick, Nancy Ellen

Language dc:language

eng

Identifier

AAI9512424
(UMI)AAI9512424

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/21840