Essays on differential information economies

In the first essay, we analyze the necessary and sufficient conditions for coalitional Bayesian Nash implementation. A mechanism coalitionally implements a social choice set if any outcome of the social choice set can be achieved as a coalitional Bayesian Nash equilibrium of a mechanism and vice versa. We say that a social choice set is coalitionally implementable if there is a mechanism which coalitionally implements it. Our main theorem proves that a social choice set is coalitionally implementable if and only if it is individually rational, Pareto optimal, coalitional Bayesian incentive compatible, and satisfies a coalitional Bayesian monotonicity condition as well as a closure condition. As an application of our main result, we show that the private core and the private Shapley value of an economy with differential information are coalitionally implementable.

Name thesis:degree_name

Ph.D.

Level thesis:degree_level

Dissertation

Discipline thesis:degree_discipline

Economics

Grantor

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Year dc:date

2011

Author dc:creator

• Hahn, Guangsug

Contributors dc:contributor

• Yannelis, Nicholas C.

• Economics, Theory

Statement dc:rights

• Copyright 1996 Hahn, Guangsug

Language dc:language

eng

Identifier

AAI9625141
(UMI)AAI9625141

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/21721