Meatpacker conduct, oligopsony power, and live cattle price dynamics

The influence of meatpacker conduct on daily cattle prices is examined in this study. Noncooperative game theory is used to model behavior in the meatpacking oligopsony. Theory suggests that for collusive behavior to persist in equilibrium, the oligopsony will follow a strategy with two actions: (1) a cooperative phase where low prices are paid for cattle, and (2) a noncooperative phase where cattle are purchased at more competitive levels. The threat of low profits in the noncooperative phase enforces collusive behavior. Thus, if market power is exercised, prices should be observed alternating between low and high levels associated with the two actions in the strategy.

Name thesis:degree_name

Ph.D.

Level thesis:degree_level

Dissertation

Discipline thesis:degree_discipline

Agricultural Economics

Grantor

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Year dc:date

2011

Author dc:creator

• Koontz, Stephen R.

Contributors dc:contributor

• Garcia, Philip

• Economics, Agricultural

Statement dc:rights

• Copyright 1991 Koontz, Stephen R.

Language dc:language

eng

Identifier

AAI9136640
(UMI)AAI9136640

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/21318