The role of courts in regulatory policy: The case of telecommunications regulation

Courts involve in regulatory policy by means of statutory judicial review, and a theory of statutory judicial review is needed to account for judicial behavior in this respect. The theory this essay presents structures statutory judicial review as a game in which players try to materialize their motives as much as possible. The ultimate outcome of this game depends on courts' strategic choices made under constraints imposed by their motives and other players' strategic choices. The theory is verified by applying to a dozen cases regarding a policy area characterized by massive judicial intervention, namely, the telecommunications regulation.

Name thesis:degree_name

Ph.D.

Level thesis:degree_level

Dissertation

Discipline thesis:degree_discipline

Political Science

Grantor

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Year dc:date

2011

Author dc:creator

• Chen, Mingsiang

Contributors dc:contributor

• Carmen, Ira H.

• Law
• Political Science, General
• Mass Communications

Statement dc:rights

• Copyright 1996 Chen, Mingsiang

Language dc:language

eng

Identifier

9780591197662
AAI9712225
(UMI)AAI9712225

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/21131