Cheap-talk pregame communication

We study a form of pre-game communication, namely, cheap-talk. The framework first proposed by Farrell (1987) is extended to symmetric games with a finite but otherwise arbitrary number of actions. An alternative theory of cheap-talk pre-game communication is proposed and its effects characterized. Farrell (1987) modelled cheap-talk with players making simultaneous announcements. We study cheap-talk with sequential announcements. The welfare implications of cheap-talk are also discussed.

Name thesis:degree_name

Ph.D.

Level thesis:degree_level

Dissertation

Discipline thesis:degree_discipline

Economics

Grantor

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Year dc:date

2011

Author dc:creator

• Santos, Vasco Manuel Sousa Borges dos

Contributors dc:contributor

• Arvan, Lanny David

• Economics, Theory

Statement dc:rights

• Copyright 1991 Santos, Vasco Manuel Sousa Borges dos

Language dc:language

eng

Identifier

AAI9124481
(UMI)AAI9124481

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/21075