Optimal contracting with predecision information: Communication problems under pure asymmetry of information

The purpose of this dissertation is to extend the communication model to a situation where the agent searches for pre-decision information with effort in his own self-interest. We first introduce the agency model that involves the agent's information-searching behavior, the choice of information system, in the economic setting of pure asymmetric information where the principal cannot observe either the agent's information system or information-searching effort.

Name thesis:degree_name

Ph.D.

Level thesis:degree_level

Dissertation

Discipline thesis:degree_discipline

Accountancy

Grantor

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Year dc:date

2011

Author dc:creator

• Lee, Jong-Cheon

Contributors dc:contributor

• McKeown, James C.

• Business Administration, Accounting
• Economics, Theory

Statement dc:rights

• Copyright 1989 Lee, Jong-Cheon

Language dc:language

eng

Identifier

AAI8916275
(UMI)AAI8916275

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/20817