Principal-agent, risk, and market structure effects on health maintenance organization choice of payment method for primary care physicians

This research analyzes determinants of HMO compensation (salary, fee-for-service, and capitation) for primary care physicians. First, a theoretical model is constructed to analyze physician preferences for fee-for-service versus capitation based on payment risk characteristics. The analysis shows that capitation can be less risky than fee-for-service. A physician's ranking of payment methods may depend on her utility function, the health distribution of HMO members, and the relationship between payment schedules and the health distribution of HMO members. In some circumstances, an HMO can pay less under capitation and still make a physician as well off as under fee-for-service.

Name thesis:degree_name

Ph.D.

Level thesis:degree_level

Dissertation

Discipline thesis:degree_discipline

Economics

Grantor

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Year dc:date

2011

Author dc:creator

• Laschober, Mary A.

Contributors dc:contributor

• Arnould, Richard J.

• Economics, Commerce-Business
• Health Sciences, Health Care Management

Statement dc:rights

• Copyright 1996 Laschober, Mary A.

Language dc:language

eng

Identifier

9780591088182
AAI9702575
(UMI)AAI9702575

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/20104