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University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
The timing of constraints and the existence of efficient incentive compatible mechanisms
Abstract
dc:descriptionAgents who have private information may misrepresent it, to manipulate a system of rules in their favor. Loss in efficiency can be an unfortunate consequence of this strategic behavior. A common problem in mechanism design concerns the selection of monetary transfers among economic agents to promote incentive compatibility and efficiency. My research focuses on studying certain aspects of the effect of incomplete information upon economic efficiency.
Degree
thesis:*- Name thesis:degree_name
- Ph.D.
- Level thesis:degree_level
- Dissertation
- Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
- Economics
- Grantor
- University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
- Year dc:date
- 2011
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Author dc:creator
-
- Kosmopoulou, Georgia
- Contributors dc:contributor
-
- Williams, Steven R.
Subjects
dc:subject × 1Rights
dc:rights- Statement dc:rights
-
- Copyright 1996 Kosmopoulou, Georgia
- Language dc:language
- eng
Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Identifier
-
9780591198676
AAI9712335
(UMI)AAI9712335 - OAI identifier oai:identifier
- oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/20100