Merleau-Ponty and the dialectic of perception

"Thought about perception finds itself confronting an antinomy: On one hand it would seem perception is the result of causal action--the effect of external objects upon us; on the other hand, there are compelling reasons to understand perception as an internally constituted event. The predominant post-Cartesian theory of perception--causal representation theory--has attempted to resolve this puzzle by synthesizing the two contrapositions through the postulation of sense-data. I argue that the philosophy of Maurice Merleau-Ponty offers a detailed and sustained critique of the program implicit in every phase of this dialectic: each type of theory, in its turn, attempts to explain the event of perception in terms of an ontological commitment that is essentially derivative from perception and hence a distorting abstraction from it. After developing each theory and re-constructing Merleau-Ponty's most persuasive arguments, I defend his own positive contribution--his ""phenomenology"" of perception--which identifies a range of interwoven perceptual structures that serve as ontological pre-conditions for thought: (1) the genealogy of objectivity, (2) the projective living body, and (3) the intersubjective world. I conclude that Merleau-Ponty's philosophy offers a solution to the antinomy of perception by inviting us to abandon the faulty ontological categories that inform it."

Name thesis:degree_name

Ph.D.

Level thesis:degree_level

Dissertation

Discipline thesis:degree_discipline

Philosophy

Grantor

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Year dc:date

2011

Author dc:creator

• Hass, Lawrence Robert

Contributors dc:contributor

• Melnick, Arthur

• Philosophy

Statement dc:rights

• Copyright 1991 Hass, Lawrence Robert

Language dc:language

eng

Identifier

AAI9124421
(UMI)AAI9124421

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/20026