Three essays on public finance: Voting, tax competition, and optimal club composition

The first essay analyzes the behavior of an imperfectly mobile voter in the presence of property value capitalization. It is shown in a dynamic model that the voter's ideal public spending level reflects a blend of his own preferences and those of the future occupant of his property. Although the voter does not seek to maximize the value of the property, his behavior confirms more closely to this principle the nearer is the date of his departure from the community or the greater is the chance of early departure when he is uncertain about the future. Finally, the analysis shows under some circumstances that the voters who are liquidity-constrained are more likely to behave as property-value maximizers than those are unconstrained.

Name thesis:degree_name

Ph.D.

Level thesis:degree_level

Dissertation

Discipline thesis:degree_discipline

Economics

Grantor

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Year dc:date

2011

Author dc:creator

• Joo, Man-Soo

Contributors dc:contributor

• Brueckner, Jan K.

• Economics, General
• Economics, Theory

Statement dc:rights

• Copyright 1990 Joo, Man-Soo

Language dc:language

eng

Identifier

AAI9114283
(UMI)AAI9114283

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/19788