The group-based binding pledge as a solution to public goods problems

A social dilemma is a situation in which members of a group are faced with a conflict between two choices: maximizing personal interests (defection) or maximizing collective interests (cooperation). It is generally more profitable to defect, but if all do so, all are worse off than if all choose to cooperate. A public goods dilemma is a special case of a social dilemma in which people must contribute resources to provide a public good. Communication, especially face-to-face discussion, has been shown to be effective in facilitating cooperation in such situations, including asking members to make a pledge to contribute (cooperate). The purpose of this study was to evaluate some explanations for the effectiveness of a pledge in enhancing cooperation. 256 undergraduate students (in groups of four subjects) were asked to make choices in a public goods dilemma. The results suggest that a pledge is effective in enhancing cooperation because it induces group identity and the perception of criticality. It is suggested that when face-to-face discussion is not feasible, a pledge system may be effective in solving real life social dilemmas.

Name thesis:degree_name

Ph.D.

Level thesis:degree_level

Dissertation

Discipline thesis:degree_discipline

Psychology

Grantor

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Year dc:date

2011

Author dc:creator

• Chen, Xiao-ping

Contributors dc:contributor

• Davis, James H.

• Psychology, Social
• Sociology, Public and Social Welfare

Statement dc:rights

• Copyright 1995 Chen, Xiao-ping

Language dc:language

eng

Identifier

AAI9543552
(UMI)AAI9543552

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/19770