Religious belief and the problems of cognitivity and commitment: A reappraisal based on contemporary philosophy of science

Chapter One surveys two prominent perspectives, each held by representative philosophers and theologians: a neo-positivist perspective that religious belief (RB) is not rational and a neo-Wittgensteinian perspective that RB may be rational but only as determined by criteria internal to RB. Both perspective sharply differentiate religion from science, maintaining that religious beliefs are either not cognitive or cognitively different and that religious commitment (RC) must be absolute. I suggest that both perspectives utilize inadequate and unnecessary perceptions of science as well as religion.

Name thesis:degree_name

Ph.D.

Level thesis:degree_level

Dissertation

Discipline thesis:degree_discipline

Philosophy

Grantor

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Year dc:date

2011

Author dc:creator

• Knopp, Richard Alan

Contributors dc:contributor

• McKim, Robert

• Religion, Philosophy of
• Philosophy
• Theology

Statement dc:rights

• Copyright 1991 Knopp, Richard Alan

Language dc:language

eng

Identifier

AAI9136638
(UMI)AAI9136638

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/19572