Coordinating Compromise: Information Manipulation and Bicameral Bargaining in the European Union

The European Union relies on a complicated—some would say arcane—set of institutions and legislative rules to develop public policy that affects millions of Europeans. Actors within these institutions must effectively navigate this convoluted institutional structure in order to legislate. Crucially, government ministers in the Council of the European Union and members of the European Parliament seek to forge bicameral bargains in a complex information environment. This study examines how European politicians construct such compromises and explores how political elites coordinate around particular proposals when crafting policy. It highlights the ways in which European lawmakers manage and share information to encourage—and hamper—legislative coordination, and emphasizes the role that the European Commission—the Union’s bureaucratic arm—plays in transmitting information between lawmakers, modulating legislative efficiency.

Name thesis:degree_name

Ph.D.

Level thesis:degree_level

Dissertation

Discipline thesis:degree_discipline

Political Science

Grantor

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Year dc:date

2011

Author dc:creator

• Pemstein, Daniel B.

Contributors dc:contributor

• Bernhard, William T.
• Gaines, Brian J.
• Pahre, Robert D.
• Sulkin, Tracy E.

• European Union
• Bicameralism
• Bargaining
• Information Asymmetry
• Legislative Influence

Statement dc:rights

• Copyright 2010 Daniel B. Pemstein

Language dc:language

en

Handle dc:identifier

http://hdl.handle.net/2142/18536

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/18536