Back to results

University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign

Leaking secrets via page walk side channels

Abstract

dc:description

Microarchitectural side-channel attacks are an insidious threat to program security. An emerging class of these attacks constructs gadgets that dereference the contents of data memory directly. This is caused by optimizations, such as speculative execution and data-memory prefetching, that can guess (incorrectly) that the program is performing a pointer chase. In theory, this is devastating for security, as dereferencing a secret seemingly leaks it over memory-based side channels, e.g., through the cache. In practice, it is not. Since most secrets do not look like valid pointers, their dereference typically fails and does not leak anything. In this paper, we introduce the page walk side channel (PWSC), a new attack that can leak information even when an invalid pointer is dereferenced. In particular, given a 64-bit secret that passes the address canonicality check, PWSC can leak all remaining bits of the secret except for the low-order 6 bits, without making any assumptions on what these bits look like. We demonstrate how PWSC amplifies leakage in scenarios exploiting speculative execution and data-memory prefetching. For speculative execution, we show that PWSC, combined with Intel’s LAM feature, can be exploited to leak nearly all of physical memory and that even without LAM, PWSC can be used to leak Dilithium secret keys. For data-memory prefetching, we reverse engineer the semantics of Intel’s data-memory dependent prefetcher (DMP) and show how this DMP and PWSC can be combined to break security in an intra-process sandbox setting.

Degree

thesis:*
Name thesis:degree_name
M.S.
Level thesis:degree_level
Thesis
Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
Computer Science
Grantor
University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
Year dc:date
2025

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Wang, Alan Linghao
Contributors dc:contributor
  • Fletcher, Christopher W

Subjects

dc:subject × 4

Rights

dc:rights
Statement dc:rights
  • Copyright 2025 Alan Linghao Wang
Language dc:language
en, eng

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Handle dc:identifier
https://hdl.handle.net/2142/129189

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
University of Illinois - Urbana-Champaign
Base URL
www.ideals.illinois.edu/oai-pmh
Last updated
2026-07-22
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Wang, Alan Linghao. Leaking secrets via page walk side channels. Thesis thesis, University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, 2025. https://hdl.handle.net/2142/129189