Towards a theory of animal rights: Adventures in metaphysics and morals

At this time, we have a century of jurisprudential and philosophical discussions on the metaphysical nature of rights. We have almost half a century of moral theory arguing for the moral rights of animals. Surprisingly, these two literatures have not intersected much. This leaves open whether the nature of rights could preclude the possibility of animal rights. It also leaves open what the nature of animal rights would be, should any of the moral arguments for animal rights be successful in their tasks. In this project, I explore these questions and show that animal rights must be conceived of as a limited form of human rights. Animals possess only passive rights (i.e. claim-rights protected by immunities) which function to advance their interests, in general. So conceived, it becomes clear why the moral arguments for animal rights have been grounded in deontological moral theories (e.g. varieties of Kantianism, contractarianism) rather than in consequentialist moral theories. Finally, even with a precise understanding of the nature of and grounds for the moral rights of animals, challenges remain regarding the ultimate force and place of animal moral rights among human moral rights.

Name thesis:degree_name

Ph.D.

Level thesis:degree_level

Dissertation

Discipline thesis:degree_discipline

Philosophy

Grantor

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Year dc:date

2020

Author dc:creator

• Polk, Amber

Contributors dc:contributor

• Livengood, Jonathan M.
• Moore, Michael S.
• Hurd, Heidi M.
• Murphy, Colleen
• Ben Moshe, Nir

• Rights
• theory of rights
• animal rights

Statement dc:rights

• Copyright 2020 Amber Polk

Language dc:language

en

Handle dc:identifier

http://hdl.handle.net/2142/108472

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/108472