Trade credit

This dissertation develops a new tractable solution method to calculate the set of equilibrium outcomes for a broad variety of dynamic economic models. These outcomes---players' payoffs in repeated games, continuation values of agents in recursive contracts, or the set of stationary distributions in recursive competitive equilibria---are given by the fixed-points of a class of set-valued contraction mapping operators. I then use the method to analyze a dynamic model of trade credit. This model features a principal/seller of an intermediate good who repeatedly sells on credit and lacks collateral to a cash-constrained buyer/agent who receives new history dependent private information each period and takes private and public actions, including, possibly, defaulting on his debt.

Name thesis:degree_name

Ph.D.

Level thesis:degree_level

Dissertation

Discipline thesis:degree_discipline

Economics

Grantor

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Year dc:date

2020

Author dc:creator

• Zare, Meysam

Contributors dc:contributor

• Bernhardt, Mark D
• Krasa, Stefan
• Parente, Stephen L
• Kahn, Charles M

• Stationary Equilibrium, Dynamic Contract, Trade Credit

Statement dc:rights

• Copyright 2019 Meysam Zare

Language dc:language

en

Handle dc:identifier

http://hdl.handle.net/2142/106492

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/106492