A Developmental Theory of Intention

In this dissertation, I advance a developmental theory of intention, according to which an intention is an action under development. In chapter 1, I define and explain the major theories in contention and offer some motivations for each. The theory that an intention is a belief (cognitivism) can help us explain practical knowledge, the theory that an intention is a sui generis mental state (DPA non-cognitivism) can help us explain the distinctive role of intention, and the theory that an intention is a process (radicalism) can help us explain rational teleology. In the rest of the dissertation, I try to show what considerations could drive us away from cognitivism and DPA non-cognitivism and toward radicalism. In Chapter 2, I show how cognitivism makes forming an intention into wishful thinking. DPA non-cognitivism has the advantage of avoiding this problem, but it maintains the idea that intention is a mental state and (most naturally) explains acting with an intention in terms of causation by a state. In Chapter 3, I show how this explanation faces the famous problem of causal deviance. I argue that this problem cannot be solved by a retreat to cognitivism as it is often understood, since the source of the problem is the assumption that an intention is a state and cognitivists often share this assumption. This, together with the previous problem, is why we should consider a non-cognitivist radicalism. In Chapter 4, I present and motivate what I take to be the best non-cognitivist radicalism: a developmental theory of intention. This theory, I argue, can overcome serious objections to a crude view-naive action theory-according to which an intention is an action in progress. In Chapter 5, I show how a developmental theory can avoid the problems that plague cognitivism and DPA non-cognitivism, and I show how it can help explain practical knowledge and the distinctive role of intention, thereby undercutting the motivation for accepting cognitivism or DPA non-cognitivism in the first place.

Department dc:contributor.department

Philosophy

Year dc:date.issued

2016

Author dc:creator

• Russell, Devlin

Advisor dc:contributor.advisor

• Clark, Philip

• Action
• Intention
• Moral Psychology
• Philosophy of Mind
• Practical Knowledge
• Teleology

Handle dc:identifier.uri

http://hdl.handle.net/1807/73138

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:utoronto.scholaris.ca:1807/73138