{"id":{"repo_id":"toronto-retro","oai_identifier":"oai:utoronto.scholaris.ca:1807/73138"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/toronto-retro/oai:utoronto.scholaris.ca:1807/73138","repository":{"repo_id":"toronto-retro","name":"University of Toronto","base_url":"https://utoronto.scholaris.ca/server/oai/request"},"display":{"title":"A Developmental Theory of Intention","abstract":"In this dissertation, I advance a developmental theory of intention, according to which an intention is an action under development. In chapter 1, I define and explain the major theories in contention and offer some motivations for each. The theory that an intention is a belief (cognitivism) can help us explain practical knowledge, the theory that an intention is a sui generis mental state (DPA non-cognitivism) can help us explain the distinctive role of intention, and the theory that an intention is a process (radicalism) can help us explain rational teleology. In the rest of the dissertation, I try to show what considerations could drive us away from cognitivism and DPA non-cognitivism and toward radicalism. In Chapter 2, I show how cognitivism makes forming an intention into wishful thinking. DPA non-cognitivism has the advantage of avoiding this problem, but it maintains the idea that intention is a mental state and (most naturally) explains acting with an intention in terms of causation by a state. In Chapter 3, I show how this explanation faces the famous problem of causal deviance. I argue that this problem cannot be solved by a retreat to cognitivism as it is often understood, since the source of the problem is the assumption that an intention is a state and cognitivists often share this assumption. This, together with the previous problem, is why we should consider a non-cognitivist radicalism. In Chapter 4, I present and motivate what I take to be the best non-cognitivist radicalism: a developmental theory of intention. This theory, I argue, can overcome serious objections to a crude view-naive action theory-according to which an intention is an action in progress. In Chapter 5, I show how a developmental theory can avoid the problems that plague cognitivism and DPA non-cognitivism, and I show how it can help explain practical knowledge and the distinctive role of intention, thereby undercutting the motivation for accepting cognitivism or DPA non-cognitivism in the first place.","abstract_html":"In this dissertation, I advance a developmental theory of intention, according to which an intention is an action under development. In chapter 1, I define and explain the major theories in contention and offer some motivations for each. The theory that an intention is a belief (cognitivism) can help us explain practical knowledge, the theory that an intention is a sui generis mental state (DPA non-cognitivism) can help us explain the distinctive role of intention, and the theory that an intention is a process (radicalism) can help us explain rational teleology. In the rest of the dissertation, I try to show what considerations could drive us away from cognitivism and DPA non-cognitivism and toward radicalism. In Chapter 2, I show how cognitivism makes forming an intention into wishful thinking. DPA non-cognitivism has the advantage of avoiding this problem, but it maintains the idea that intention is a mental state and (most naturally) explains acting with an intention in terms of causation by a state. In Chapter 3, I show how this explanation faces the famous problem of causal deviance. I argue that this problem cannot be solved by a retreat to cognitivism as it is often understood, since the source of the problem is the assumption that an intention is a state and cognitivists often share this assumption. This, together with the previous problem, is why we should consider a non-cognitivist radicalism. In Chapter 4, I present and motivate what I take to be the best non-cognitivist radicalism: a developmental theory of intention. This theory, I argue, can overcome serious objections to a crude view-naive action theory-according to which an intention is an action in progress. In Chapter 5, I show how a developmental theory can avoid the problems that plague cognitivism and DPA non-cognitivism, and I show how it can help explain practical knowledge and the distinctive role of intention, thereby undercutting the motivation for accepting cognitivism or DPA non-cognitivism in the first place.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Russell, Devlin"],"institution":null,"degree_name":null,"degree_level":null,"degree_discipline":null,"degree_department":"Philosophy","school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":["Clark, Philip"],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2016,"date_issued":"2016-06","date_published":"2016-06","updated_at":"2026-07-27T21:27:52Z","subjects":["Action","Intention","Moral Psychology","Philosophy of Mind","Practical Knowledge","Teleology"],"languages":[],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"http://hdl.handle.net/1807/73138","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier.uri"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor.advisor","label":"Advisor","values":["Clark, Philip"]},{"key":"dc:contributor.department","label":"Department","values":["Philosophy"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Russell, Devlin"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date","label":"Dc Date","values":["2016-06"]},{"key":"dc:date.accessioned","label":"Dc Date Accessioned","values":["2016-07-19T20:00:14Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.available","label":"Dc Date Available","values":["2016-07-19T20:00:14Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.issued","label":"Date","values":["2016-06"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["Thesis"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Action","Intention","Moral Psychology","Philosophy of Mind","Practical Knowledge","Teleology"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.uri","label":"Identifier URI","values":["http://hdl.handle.net/1807/73138"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["In this dissertation, I advance a developmental theory of intention, according to which an intention is an action under development. In chapter 1, I define and explain the major theories in contention and offer some motivations for each. The theory that an intention is a belief (cognitivism) can help us explain practical knowledge, the theory that an intention is a sui generis mental state (DPA non-cognitivism) can help us explain the distinctive role of intention, and the theory that an intention is a process (radicalism) can help us explain rational teleology. In the rest of the dissertation, I try to show what considerations could drive us away from cognitivism and DPA non-cognitivism and toward radicalism. In Chapter 2, I show how cognitivism makes forming an intention into wishful thinking. DPA non-cognitivism has the advantage of avoiding this problem, but it maintains the idea that intention is a mental state and (most naturally) explains acting with an intention in terms of causation by a state. In Chapter 3, I show how this explanation faces the famous problem of causal deviance. I argue that this problem cannot be solved by a retreat to cognitivism as it is often understood, since the source of the problem is the assumption that an intention is a state and cognitivists often share this assumption. This, together with the previous problem, is why we should consider a non-cognitivist radicalism. In Chapter 4, I present and motivate what I take to be the best non-cognitivist radicalism: a developmental theory of intention. This theory, I argue, can overcome serious objections to a crude view-naive action theory-according to which an intention is an action in progress. In Chapter 5, I show how a developmental theory can avoid the problems that plague cognitivism and DPA non-cognitivism, and I show how it can help explain practical knowledge and the distinctive role of intention, thereby undercutting the motivation for accepting cognitivism or DPA non-cognitivism in the first place."]},{"key":"dc:description.degree","label":"Dc Description Degree","values":["Ph.D."]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["A Developmental Theory of Intention"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor.advisor":["Clark, Philip"],"dc:contributor.department":["Philosophy"],"dc:creator":["Russell, Devlin"],"dc:date":["2016-06"],"dc:date.accessioned":["2016-07-19T20:00:14Z"],"dc:date.available":["2016-07-19T20:00:14Z"],"dc:date.issued":["2016-06"],"dc:description.abstract":["In this dissertation, I advance a developmental theory of intention, according to which an intention is an action under development. In chapter 1, I define and explain the major theories in contention and offer some motivations for each. The theory that an intention is a belief (cognitivism) can help us explain practical knowledge, the theory that an intention is a sui generis mental state (DPA non-cognitivism) can help us explain the distinctive role of intention, and the theory that an intention is a process (radicalism) can help us explain rational teleology. In the rest of the dissertation, I try to show what considerations could drive us away from cognitivism and DPA non-cognitivism and toward radicalism. In Chapter 2, I show how cognitivism makes forming an intention into wishful thinking. DPA non-cognitivism has the advantage of avoiding this problem, but it maintains the idea that intention is a mental state and (most naturally) explains acting with an intention in terms of causation by a state. In Chapter 3, I show how this explanation faces the famous problem of causal deviance. I argue that this problem cannot be solved by a retreat to cognitivism as it is often understood, since the source of the problem is the assumption that an intention is a state and cognitivists often share this assumption. This, together with the previous problem, is why we should consider a non-cognitivist radicalism. In Chapter 4, I present and motivate what I take to be the best non-cognitivist radicalism: a developmental theory of intention. This theory, I argue, can overcome serious objections to a crude view-naive action theory-according to which an intention is an action in progress. In Chapter 5, I show how a developmental theory can avoid the problems that plague cognitivism and DPA non-cognitivism, and I show how it can help explain practical knowledge and the distinctive role of intention, thereby undercutting the motivation for accepting cognitivism or DPA non-cognitivism in the first place."],"dc:description.degree":["Ph.D."],"dc:identifier.uri":["http://hdl.handle.net/1807/73138"],"dc:subject":["Action","Intention","Moral Psychology","Philosophy of Mind","Practical Knowledge","Teleology"],"dc:title":["A Developmental Theory of Intention"],"dc:type":["Thesis"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-27T21:27:52Z"}