The Grounds of Transcendental Idealism

This dissertation consists of three papers on the role of ground in the metaphysics of transcendental idealism. In the first two papers, I provide novel reconstructions of Kant’s two main arguments for transcendental idealism. I show that both arguments rely on assumptions about the metaphysics and epistemology of ground that were commonplace in Kant’s time. In the third paper, I provide a new interpretation of transcendental idealism, by drawing a conceptual distinction between two forms of intentionality: reference and truthmaking. I argue that this interpretation manages to avoid many of the traditional problems for traditional readings of Kant.

Department dc:contributor.department

Philosophy

Year dc:date.issued

2021

Author dc:creator

• Melamedoff, Damian Ezequiel

Advisor dc:contributor.advisor

• Stang, Nicholas F

• Ground
• Kant
• Metaphysics
• Transcendental Idealism
• Truthmaking

Handle dc:identifier.uri

http://hdl.handle.net/1807/108873

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:utoronto.scholaris.ca:1807/108873