{"id":{"repo_id":"toronto-retro","oai_identifier":"oai:utoronto.scholaris.ca:1807/108873"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/toronto-retro/oai:utoronto.scholaris.ca:1807/108873","repository":{"repo_id":"toronto-retro","name":"University of Toronto","base_url":"https://utoronto.scholaris.ca/server/oai/request"},"display":{"title":"The Grounds of Transcendental Idealism","abstract":"This dissertation consists of three papers on the role of ground in the metaphysics of transcendental idealism. In the first two papers, I provide novel reconstructions of Kant’s two main arguments for transcendental idealism. I show that both arguments rely on assumptions about the metaphysics and epistemology of ground that were commonplace in Kant’s time. In the third paper, I provide a new interpretation of transcendental idealism, by drawing a conceptual distinction between two forms of intentionality: reference and truthmaking. 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