Seeing Right from Wrong: A Defense of A Posteriori Ethical Intuitionism

<p>This dissertation develops and defends the claim that our epistemic access to</p> <p>moral properties is grounded in a posteriori perceptual experiences. It is divided into</p> <p>two parts. In part I, I present the epistemic access problem for realist moral</p> <p>epistemology, and then argue against several a priori attempts to resolve the problem. I</p> <p>begin by defending an understanding of evolutionary debunking arguments according</p> <p>to which the problem is grounded in a lack of epistemic access to sui generis, non-causal</p> <p>moral facts. Next, I argue that even the most sophisticated versions of reflective</p> <p>equilibrium fall victim to the “garbage in, garbage out” objection which besets</p> <p>coherentist theories more generally. I then survey the most influential other a priori</p> <p>approaches to epistemic access. I conclude that each of them is victim to some variation</p> <p>of the same dilemma: Either they fail to ensure epistemic access, or they succeed by</p> <p>providing epistemic access to the wrong properties—viz. not the robustly normative</p> <p>ones.</p> <p>In part II, I defend a wholly a posteriori moral epistemology according to which</p> <p>our epistemic access to the moral properties is via perceptual experience. I begin with a</p> <p>positive argument that moral properties figure in the contents of perceptual experience,</p> <p>making use of the “method of contrast” found in the philosophy of perception</p> <p>literature. Next, I defend the foundationalist credentials of the perceptualist view in</p> <p>light of the objection that moral experiences will be epistemically dependent on prior</p> <p>background (moral) beliefs. I claim that the epistemic dependence of these moral</p> <p>experiences depends on the nature of influence the prior beliefs have and that the</p> <p>influence is not of the problematic sort. I then discuss the role of emotions in generating</p> <p>moral perceptions. I argue that emotions play an essential role in moral perceptual</p> <p>experiences, but that this is compatible with foundationalism and perceptualism.</p> <p>Finally, I return to the issue of epistemic access, arguing that the perceptual view</p> <p>provides an explanation of our epistemic access to the moral properties.</p>

Name thesis:degree_name

Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

Level thesis:degree_level

Dissertation

Discipline thesis:degree_discipline

Philosophy

Year

2016

Author dc:creator

• Werner, Preston John

Contributors dc:contributor

• David Sobel

• epistemology
• moral epistemology
• moral perception
• moral psychology
• moral realism
• non-naturalism
• Arts and Humanities

Repository record dc:identifier

https://surface.syr.edu/etd/532

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:surface.syr.edu:etd-1532