This dissertation develops and defends the claim that our epistemic access to
moral properties is grounded in a posteriori perceptual experiences. It is divided into
two parts. In part I, I present the epistemic access problem for realist moral
epistemology, and then argue against several a priori attempts to resolve the problem. I
begin by defending an understanding of evolutionary debunking arguments according
to which the problem is grounded in a lack of epistemic access to sui generis, non-causal
moral facts. Next, I argue that even the most sophisticated versions of reflective
equilibrium fall victim to the “garbage in, garbage out” objection which besets
coherentist theories more generally. I then survey the most influential other a priori
approaches to epistemic access. I conclude that each of them is victim to some variation
of the same dilemma: Either they fail to ensure epistemic access, or they succeed by
providing epistemic access to the wrong properties—viz. not the robustly normative
ones.
In part II, I defend a wholly a posteriori moral epistemology according to which
our epistemic access to the moral properties is via perceptual experience. I begin with a
positive argument that moral properties figure in the contents of perceptual experience,
making use of the “method of contrast” found in the philosophy of perception
literature. Next, I defend the foundationalist credentials of the perceptualist view in
light of the objection that moral experiences will be epistemically dependent on prior
background (moral) beliefs. I claim that the epistemic dependence of these moral
experiences depends on the nature of influence the prior beliefs have and that the
influence is not of the problematic sort. I then discuss the role of emotions in generating
moral perceptions. I argue that emotions play an essential role in moral perceptual
experiences, but that this is compatible with foundationalism and perceptualism.
Finally, I return to the issue of epistemic access, arguing that the perceptual view
provides an explanation of our epistemic access to the moral properties.
","abstract_html":"<p>This dissertation develops and defends the claim that our epistemic access to</p> <p>moral properties is grounded in a posteriori perceptual experiences. It is divided into</p> <p>two parts. In part I, I present the epistemic access problem for realist moral</p> <p>epistemology, and then argue against several a priori attempts to resolve the problem. I</p> <p>begin by defending an understanding of evolutionary debunking arguments according</p> <p>to which the problem is grounded in a lack of epistemic access to sui generis, non-causal</p> <p>moral facts. Next, I argue that even the most sophisticated versions of reflective</p> <p>equilibrium fall victim to the “garbage in, garbage out” objection which besets</p> <p>coherentist theories more generally. I then survey the most influential other a priori</p> <p>approaches to epistemic access. I conclude that each of them is victim to some variation</p> <p>of the same dilemma: Either they fail to ensure epistemic access, or they succeed by</p> <p>providing epistemic access to the wrong properties—viz. not the robustly normative</p> <p>ones.</p> <p>In part II, I defend a wholly a posteriori moral epistemology according to which</p> <p>our epistemic access to the moral properties is via perceptual experience. I begin with a</p> <p>positive argument that moral properties figure in the contents of perceptual experience,</p> <p>making use of the “method of contrast” found in the philosophy of perception</p> <p>literature. Next, I defend the foundationalist credentials of the perceptualist view in</p> <p>light of the objection that moral experiences will be epistemically dependent on prior</p> <p>background (moral) beliefs. I claim that the epistemic dependence of these moral</p> <p>experiences depends on the nature of influence the prior beliefs have and that the</p> <p>influence is not of the problematic sort. I then discuss the role of emotions in generating</p> <p>moral perceptions. I argue that emotions play an essential role in moral perceptual</p> <p>experiences, but that this is compatible with foundationalism and perceptualism.</p> <p>Finally, I return to the issue of epistemic access, arguing that the perceptual view</p> <p>provides an explanation of our epistemic access to the moral properties.</p>","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Werner, Preston John"],"institution":null,"degree_name":"Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)","degree_level":"Dissertation","degree_discipline":"Philosophy","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":["David Sobel"],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2016,"date_issued":"2016-07-01T07:00:00Z","date_published":"2016-07-01T07:00:00Z","updated_at":"2026-07-24T04:55:13Z","subjects":["epistemology","moral epistemology","moral perception","moral psychology","moral realism","non-naturalism","Arts and Humanities"],"languages":[],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://surface.syr.edu/etd/532","outbound_label":"Repository record","outbound_source":"dc:identifier"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor","label":"Contributor","values":["David Sobel"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Werner, Preston John"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Philosophy"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["Dissertation"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["epistemology","moral epistemology","moral perception","moral psychology","moral realism","non-naturalism","Arts and Humanities"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["https://surface.syr.edu/etd/532"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["This dissertation develops and defends the claim that our epistemic access to
moral properties is grounded in a posteriori perceptual experiences. It is divided into
two parts. In part I, I present the epistemic access problem for realist moral
epistemology, and then argue against several a priori attempts to resolve the problem. I
begin by defending an understanding of evolutionary debunking arguments according
to which the problem is grounded in a lack of epistemic access to sui generis, non-causal
moral facts. Next, I argue that even the most sophisticated versions of reflective
equilibrium fall victim to the “garbage in, garbage out” objection which besets
coherentist theories more generally. I then survey the most influential other a priori
approaches to epistemic access. I conclude that each of them is victim to some variation
of the same dilemma: Either they fail to ensure epistemic access, or they succeed by
providing epistemic access to the wrong properties—viz. not the robustly normative
ones.
In part II, I defend a wholly a posteriori moral epistemology according to which
our epistemic access to the moral properties is via perceptual experience. I begin with a
positive argument that moral properties figure in the contents of perceptual experience,
making use of the “method of contrast” found in the philosophy of perception
literature. Next, I defend the foundationalist credentials of the perceptualist view in
light of the objection that moral experiences will be epistemically dependent on prior
background (moral) beliefs. I claim that the epistemic dependence of these moral
experiences depends on the nature of influence the prior beliefs have and that the
influence is not of the problematic sort. I then discuss the role of emotions in generating
moral perceptions. I argue that emotions play an essential role in moral perceptual
experiences, but that this is compatible with foundationalism and perceptualism.
Finally, I return to the issue of epistemic access, arguing that the perceptual view
provides an explanation of our epistemic access to the moral properties.
"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Seeing Right from Wrong: A Defense of A Posteriori Ethical Intuitionism"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor":["David Sobel"],"dc:creator":["Werner, Preston John"],"dc:description.abstract":["This dissertation develops and defends the claim that our epistemic access to
moral properties is grounded in a posteriori perceptual experiences. It is divided into
two parts. In part I, I present the epistemic access problem for realist moral
epistemology, and then argue against several a priori attempts to resolve the problem. I
begin by defending an understanding of evolutionary debunking arguments according
to which the problem is grounded in a lack of epistemic access to sui generis, non-causal
moral facts. Next, I argue that even the most sophisticated versions of reflective
equilibrium fall victim to the “garbage in, garbage out” objection which besets
coherentist theories more generally. I then survey the most influential other a priori
approaches to epistemic access. I conclude that each of them is victim to some variation
of the same dilemma: Either they fail to ensure epistemic access, or they succeed by
providing epistemic access to the wrong properties—viz. not the robustly normative
ones.
In part II, I defend a wholly a posteriori moral epistemology according to which
our epistemic access to the moral properties is via perceptual experience. I begin with a
positive argument that moral properties figure in the contents of perceptual experience,
making use of the “method of contrast” found in the philosophy of perception
literature. Next, I defend the foundationalist credentials of the perceptualist view in
light of the objection that moral experiences will be epistemically dependent on prior
background (moral) beliefs. I claim that the epistemic dependence of these moral
experiences depends on the nature of influence the prior beliefs have and that the
influence is not of the problematic sort. I then discuss the role of emotions in generating
moral perceptions. I argue that emotions play an essential role in moral perceptual
experiences, but that this is compatible with foundationalism and perceptualism.
Finally, I return to the issue of epistemic access, arguing that the perceptual view
provides an explanation of our epistemic access to the moral properties.
"],"dc:identifier":["https://surface.syr.edu/etd/532"],"dc:subject":["epistemology","moral epistemology","moral perception","moral psychology","moral realism","non-naturalism","Arts and Humanities"],"dc:title":["Seeing Right from Wrong: A Defense of A Posteriori Ethical Intuitionism"],"thesis:degree_discipline":["Philosophy"],"thesis:degree_level":["Dissertation"],"thesis:degree_name":["Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-24T04:55:13Z"}