Adding Tournament to Tournament: The Interactive Effect of Team and Individual Incentives

<p>This study experimentally investigates the interactive effect of individual and team incentive systems on effort. Using economic and social identity theories, I examine whether both free-riding and collusion problems can be simultaneously mitigated when a combination of individual and team incentive systems are used. Consistent with the extended Nitzan's (1991) nested contest economic model and social identity theory (SIT), I find that when a between-team tournament exists, individuals are likely to exert greater effort, compared to when there is no such tournament. However, inconsistent with the joint maximization Nash equilibrium predictions from the model, I find that a within-team tournament has a positive effect on individuals' effort, as suggested by SIT. Further, the results show that in comparison, individuals facing both between-team and within-team competition are motivated to exert the greatest effort mitigating both free-riding and collusion problems.</p>

Name thesis:degree_name

Ph.D.

Level thesis:degree_level

Campus Access Dissertation

Discipline thesis:degree_discipline

Moore School of Business

Year

2011

Author dc:creator

• Tian, Yu

Contributors dc:contributor

• Robert A Leitch

• Business
• Business Administration, Management, and Operations
• collusion
• free riding
• individual incentive
• team incentive
• tournament

Statement dc:rights

• © 2011, Yu Tian

Repository record dc:identifier

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/etd/478

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:scholarcommons.sc.edu:etd-1479