This study experimentally investigates the interactive effect of individual and team incentive systems on effort. Using economic and social identity theories, I examine whether both free-riding and collusion problems can be simultaneously mitigated when a combination of individual and team incentive systems are used. Consistent with the extended Nitzan's (1991) nested contest economic model and social identity theory (SIT), I find that when a between-team tournament exists, individuals are likely to exert greater effort, compared to when there is no such tournament. However, inconsistent with the joint maximization Nash equilibrium predictions from the model, I find that a within-team tournament has a positive effect on individuals' effort, as suggested by SIT. Further, the results show that in comparison, individuals facing both between-team and within-team competition are motivated to exert the greatest effort mitigating both free-riding and collusion problems.
","abstract_html":"<p>This study experimentally investigates the interactive effect of individual and team incentive systems on effort. Using economic and social identity theories, I examine whether both free-riding and collusion problems can be simultaneously mitigated when a combination of individual and team incentive systems are used. Consistent with the extended Nitzan's (1991) nested contest economic model and social identity theory (SIT), I find that when a between-team tournament exists, individuals are likely to exert greater effort, compared to when there is no such tournament. However, inconsistent with the joint maximization Nash equilibrium predictions from the model, I find that a within-team tournament has a positive effect on individuals' effort, as suggested by SIT. Further, the results show that in comparison, individuals facing both between-team and within-team competition are motivated to exert the greatest effort mitigating both free-riding and collusion problems.</p>","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Tian, Yu"],"institution":null,"degree_name":"Ph.D.","degree_level":"Campus Access Dissertation","degree_discipline":"Moore School of Business","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":["Robert A Leitch"],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2011,"date_issued":"2011-01-01T08:00:00Z","date_published":"2011-01-01T08:00:00Z","updated_at":"2026-07-24T04:37:34Z","subjects":["Business","Business Administration, Management, and Operations","collusion","free riding","individual incentive","team incentive","tournament"],"languages":[],"rights":["© 2011, Yu Tian"],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/etd/478","outbound_label":"Repository record","outbound_source":"dc:identifier"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor","label":"Contributor","values":["Robert A Leitch"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Tian, Yu"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Moore School of Business"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["Campus Access Dissertation"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["Ph.D."]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Business","Business Administration, Management, and Operations","collusion","free riding","individual incentive","team incentive","tournament"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:rights","label":"Dc Rights","values":["© 2011, Yu Tian"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/etd/478"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["This study experimentally investigates the interactive effect of individual and team incentive systems on effort. Using economic and social identity theories, I examine whether both free-riding and collusion problems can be simultaneously mitigated when a combination of individual and team incentive systems are used. Consistent with the extended Nitzan's (1991) nested contest economic model and social identity theory (SIT), I find that when a between-team tournament exists, individuals are likely to exert greater effort, compared to when there is no such tournament. However, inconsistent with the joint maximization Nash equilibrium predictions from the model, I find that a within-team tournament has a positive effect on individuals' effort, as suggested by SIT. Further, the results show that in comparison, individuals facing both between-team and within-team competition are motivated to exert the greatest effort mitigating both free-riding and collusion problems.
"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Adding Tournament to Tournament: The Interactive Effect of Team and Individual Incentives"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor":["Robert A Leitch"],"dc:creator":["Tian, Yu"],"dc:description.abstract":["This study experimentally investigates the interactive effect of individual and team incentive systems on effort. Using economic and social identity theories, I examine whether both free-riding and collusion problems can be simultaneously mitigated when a combination of individual and team incentive systems are used. Consistent with the extended Nitzan's (1991) nested contest economic model and social identity theory (SIT), I find that when a between-team tournament exists, individuals are likely to exert greater effort, compared to when there is no such tournament. However, inconsistent with the joint maximization Nash equilibrium predictions from the model, I find that a within-team tournament has a positive effect on individuals' effort, as suggested by SIT. Further, the results show that in comparison, individuals facing both between-team and within-team competition are motivated to exert the greatest effort mitigating both free-riding and collusion problems.
"],"dc:identifier":["https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/etd/478"],"dc:rights":["© 2011, Yu Tian"],"dc:subject":["Business","Business Administration, Management, and Operations","collusion","free riding","individual incentive","team incentive","tournament"],"dc:title":["Adding Tournament to Tournament: The Interactive Effect of Team and Individual Incentives"],"thesis:degree_discipline":["Moore School of Business"],"thesis:degree_level":["Campus Access Dissertation"],"thesis:degree_name":["Ph.D."]},"updated_at":"2026-07-24T04:37:34Z"}