Reputation with stopping time decision

This paper studies a long run relationship between two players while one player has reputation concern and the other player's decision is a stopping time. The equilibrium structure depends on the value of the long run relationship: when the value of the relationship is low, a simple threshold equilibrium is the unique equilibrium; when the value becomes higher, a probationary period endogenously arises when reputation is in an intermediate region. Reputation concern also has discipline effect, moral hazard problem is mitigated when player's reputation becomes worse, and the discipline effect is dominating when reputation is sufficiently bad.

Name thesis:degree_name

Master

Department dc:contributor.department

Sloan School of Management

Grantor dc:publisher

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Year dc:date.issued

2020

Author dc:creator

• Sun, Jian(Scientist in business management)Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Advisor dc:contributor.advisor

• Hui Chen.

• Sloan School of Management.

Statement dc:rights

• MIT theses may be protected by copyright. Please reuse MIT thesis content according to the MIT Libraries Permissions Policy, which is available through the URL provided.

Licence dc:rights.uri

• http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582

Language dc:language.iso

eng

Handle dc:identifier.uri

https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/129088

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/129088