{"id":{"repo_id":"mit","oai_identifier":"oai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/129088"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/mit/oai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/129088","repository":{"repo_id":"mit","name":"MIT","base_url":"https://dspace.mit.edu/oai/request"},"display":{"title":"Reputation with stopping time decision","abstract":"This paper studies a long run relationship between two players while one player has reputation concern and the other player's decision is a stopping time. The equilibrium structure depends on the value of the long run relationship: when the value of the relationship is low, a simple threshold equilibrium is the unique equilibrium; when the value becomes higher, a probationary period endogenously arises when reputation is in an intermediate region. Reputation concern also has discipline effect, moral hazard problem is mitigated when player's reputation becomes worse, and the discipline effect is dominating when reputation is sufficiently bad.","abstract_html":"This paper studies a long run relationship between two players while one player has reputation concern and the other player's decision is a stopping time. The equilibrium structure depends on the value of the long run relationship: when the value of the relationship is low, a simple threshold equilibrium is the unique equilibrium; when the value becomes higher, a probationary period endogenously arises when reputation is in an intermediate region. Reputation concern also has discipline effect, moral hazard problem is mitigated when player's reputation becomes worse, and the discipline effect is dominating when reputation is sufficiently bad.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Sun, Jian(Scientist in business management)Massachusetts Institute of Technology."],"institution":"Massachusetts Institute of Technology","degree_name":"Master","degree_level":null,"degree_discipline":null,"degree_department":"Sloan School of Management","school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":["Hui Chen."],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2020,"date_issued":"2020","date_published":"2020","updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:22:14Z","subjects":["Sloan School of Management."],"languages":["eng"],"rights":["MIT theses may be protected by copyright. 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The equilibrium structure depends on the value of the long run relationship: when the value of the relationship is low, a simple threshold equilibrium is the unique equilibrium; when the value becomes higher, a probationary period endogenously arises when reputation is in an intermediate region. Reputation concern also has discipline effect, moral hazard problem is mitigated when player's reputation becomes worse, and the discipline effect is dominating when reputation is sufficiently bad."]},{"key":"dc:description.degree","label":"Dc Description Degree","values":["S.M. in Management Research"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Reputation with stopping time decision"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor.advisor":["Hui Chen."],"dc:contributor.department":["Sloan School of Management","Sloan"],"dc:contributor.other":["Sloan School of Management."],"dc:creator":["Sun, Jian(Scientist in business management)Massachusetts Institute of Technology."],"dc:date.accessioned":["2021-01-06T17:39:08Z"],"dc:date.available":["2021-01-06T17:39:08Z"],"dc:date.issued":["2020"],"dc:description":["Thesis: S.M. in Management Research, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of Management, September, 2020","Cataloged from student-submitted PDF version of thesis.","Includes bibliographical references (pages 27-28)."],"dc:description.abstract":["This paper studies a long run relationship between two players while one player has reputation concern and the other player's decision is a stopping time. The equilibrium structure depends on the value of the long run relationship: when the value of the relationship is low, a simple threshold equilibrium is the unique equilibrium; when the value becomes higher, a probationary period endogenously arises when reputation is in an intermediate region. Reputation concern also has discipline effect, moral hazard problem is mitigated when player's reputation becomes worse, and the discipline effect is dominating when reputation is sufficiently bad."],"dc:description.degree":["S.M. in Management Research"],"dc:identifier.uri":["https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/129088"],"dc:language.iso":["eng"],"dc:publisher":["Massachusetts Institute of Technology"],"dc:rights":["MIT theses may be protected by copyright. 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