Baiting for defense against stealthy attacks on cyber-physical systems

The goal of this thesis is to develop a defense methodology for a cyber-physical system (CPS) by which an attempted stealthy cyber-attack is detected in near real time. Improvements in networked communication have enabled vast and complex dynamic control systems to exploit networked control schemes to seamlessly integrate parts and processes. These cyber-physical systems exhibit a level of flexibility that was previously unavailable but also introduce communication channels that are vulnerable to outside interference and malicious intervention. This thesis considers the effects of a type of stealthy attack on a class of CPS that can be modeled as linear time-invariant systems. The effects of this attack are studied from both the perspective of the attacker as well as the defender. A previously developed method for conducting stealthy attacks is introduced and analyzed.

Name thesis:degree_name

Master

Department dc:contributor.department

Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Mechanical Engineering

Grantor dc:publisher

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Year dc:date.issued

2019

Author dc:creator

• Flamholz, David B.

Advisor dc:contributor.advisor

• Anuradha M. Annaswamy.

• Mechanical Engineering.

Statement dc:rights

• MIT theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed, downloaded, or printed from this source but further reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission.

Licence dc:rights.uri

• http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582

Language dc:language.iso

eng

Handle dc:identifier.uri

https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/121858

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/121858