Sellars and Socrates : an investigation of the Sellars problem for a Socratic epistemology

The Sellars problem threatens the viability of epistemic foundationalism. Foundationalism claims that there are some beliefs whose justification does not depend upon other beliefs. Foundationalism is a popular, non-skeptical response to the epistemic regress problem. In this dissertation I investigate the Sellars problem for a Socratic epistemology, an epistemological theory that takes the egocentric good reasons question as primary. I argue that the Sellars problem forces one to abandon the foundationalist project for empirical justification. In the place of foundationalist I offer a nondoxastic coherentist account of empirical justification. This account solves the epistemic regress problem. It also secures a positive answer to the egocentric good reasons question.

Name thesis:degree_name

Ph. D.

Level thesis:degree_level

Doctoral

Discipline thesis:degree_discipline

Philosophy (MU)

Grantor dc:publisher

University of Missouri--Columbia

Year dc:date.issued

2006

Author dc:creator

• Poston, Ted L.

Advisor dc:contributor.advisor

• Kvanvig, Jonathan L.

Statement dc:rights

• OpenAccess.

Language dc:language.iso

eng, English

DOI

https://doi.org/10.32469/10355/4494

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:mospace.umsystem.edu:10355/4494