{"id":{"repo_id":"missouri","oai_identifier":"oai:mospace.umsystem.edu:10355/4494"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/missouri/oai:mospace.umsystem.edu:10355/4494","repository":{"repo_id":"missouri","name":"University of Missouri","base_url":"https://mospace.umsystem.edu/oai/request"},"display":{"title":"Sellars and Socrates : an investigation of the Sellars problem for a Socratic epistemology","abstract":"The Sellars problem threatens the viability of epistemic foundationalism. Foundationalism claims that there are some beliefs whose justification does not depend upon other beliefs. Foundationalism is a popular, non-skeptical response to the epistemic regress problem. In this dissertation I investigate the Sellars problem for a Socratic epistemology, an epistemological theory that takes the egocentric good reasons question as primary. I argue that the Sellars problem forces one to abandon the foundationalist project for empirical justification. In the place of foundationalist I offer a nondoxastic coherentist account of empirical justification. This account solves the epistemic regress problem. It also secures a positive answer to the egocentric good reasons question.","abstract_html":"The Sellars problem threatens the viability of epistemic foundationalism. Foundationalism claims that there are some beliefs whose justification does not depend upon other beliefs. Foundationalism is a popular, non-skeptical response to the epistemic regress problem. In this dissertation I investigate the Sellars problem for a Socratic epistemology, an epistemological theory that takes the egocentric good reasons question as primary. I argue that the Sellars problem forces one to abandon the foundationalist project for empirical justification. In the place of foundationalist I offer a nondoxastic coherentist account of empirical justification. This account solves the epistemic regress problem. It also secures a positive answer to the egocentric good reasons question.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Poston, Ted L."],"institution":"University of Missouri--Columbia","degree_name":"Ph. D.","degree_level":"Doctoral","degree_discipline":"Philosophy (MU)","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":["Kvanvig, Jonathan L."],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2006,"date_issued":"2006","date_published":"2006","updated_at":"2026-07-24T03:09:27Z","subjects":[],"languages":["eng","English"],"rights":["OpenAccess."],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.doi","label":"DOI","values":["https://doi.org/10.32469/10355/4494"],"render_values":[{"text":"https://doi.org/10.32469/10355/4494","href":"https://doi.org/10.32469/10355/4494","code":true}]}]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://hdl.handle.net/10355/4494","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier.uri"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor.advisor","label":"Advisor","values":["Kvanvig, Jonathan L."]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Poston, Ted L."]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date.accessioned","label":"Dc Date Accessioned","values":["2010-01-12T17:08:28Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.available","label":"Dc Date Available","values":["2010-01-12T17:08:28Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.issued","label":"Date","values":["2006"]},{"key":"dc:publisher","label":"Institution","values":["University of Missouri--Columbia"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["Thesis"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Philosophy (MU)"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["Doctoral"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["Ph. D."]},{"key":"thesis:institution_name","label":"Thesis Institution Name","values":["University of Missouri--Columbia"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language","label":"Dc Language","values":["English"]},{"key":"dc:language.iso","label":"Language (ISO)","values":["eng"]},{"key":"dc:rights","label":"Dc Rights","values":["OpenAccess."]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.doi","label":"DOI","values":["https://doi.org/10.32469/10355/4494"]},{"key":"dc:identifier.uri","label":"Identifier URI","values":["https://hdl.handle.net/10355/4494"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description","label":"Description","values":["Entire dissertation/thesis text is included in the research.pdf file; the official abstract appears in the short.pdf file (which also appears in the research.pdf) a non-technical general description, or public abstract, appears in the public.pdf file.","Title from title screen of research.pdf file viewed on (February 28, 2007)","Vita.","Thesis (Ph.D.) University of Missouri-Columbia 2006."]},{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["The Sellars problem threatens the viability of epistemic foundationalism. Foundationalism claims that there are some beliefs whose justification does not depend upon other beliefs. Foundationalism is a popular, non-skeptical response to the epistemic regress problem. In this dissertation I investigate the Sellars problem for a Socratic epistemology, an epistemological theory that takes the egocentric good reasons question as primary. I argue that the Sellars problem forces one to abandon the foundationalist project for empirical justification. In the place of foundationalist I offer a nondoxastic coherentist account of empirical justification. This account solves the epistemic regress problem. It also secures a positive answer to the egocentric good reasons question."]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Sellars and Socrates : an investigation of the Sellars problem for a Socratic epistemology"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor.advisor":["Kvanvig, Jonathan L."],"dc:creator":["Poston, Ted L."],"dc:date.accessioned":["2010-01-12T17:08:28Z"],"dc:date.available":["2010-01-12T17:08:28Z"],"dc:date.issued":["2006"],"dc:description":["Entire dissertation/thesis text is included in the research.pdf file; the official abstract appears in the short.pdf file (which also appears in the research.pdf) a non-technical general description, or public abstract, appears in the public.pdf file.","Title from title screen of research.pdf file viewed on (February 28, 2007)","Vita.","Thesis (Ph.D.) University of Missouri-Columbia 2006."],"dc:description.abstract":["The Sellars problem threatens the viability of epistemic foundationalism. Foundationalism claims that there are some beliefs whose justification does not depend upon other beliefs. Foundationalism is a popular, non-skeptical response to the epistemic regress problem. In this dissertation I investigate the Sellars problem for a Socratic epistemology, an epistemological theory that takes the egocentric good reasons question as primary. I argue that the Sellars problem forces one to abandon the foundationalist project for empirical justification. In the place of foundationalist I offer a nondoxastic coherentist account of empirical justification. This account solves the epistemic regress problem. It also secures a positive answer to the egocentric good reasons question."],"dc:identifier.doi":["https://doi.org/10.32469/10355/4494"],"dc:identifier.uri":["https://hdl.handle.net/10355/4494"],"dc:language":["English"],"dc:language.iso":["eng"],"dc:publisher":["University of Missouri--Columbia"],"dc:rights":["OpenAccess."],"dc:title":["Sellars and Socrates : an investigation of the Sellars problem for a Socratic epistemology"],"dc:type":["Thesis"],"thesis:degree_discipline":["Philosophy (MU)"],"thesis:degree_level":["Doctoral"],"thesis:degree_name":["Ph. D."],"thesis:institution_name":["University of Missouri--Columbia"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-24T03:09:27Z"}