Incentive Contracts for Politicians

The thesis studies the potential of incentive contracts for politicians using game-theoretic methods. Supplementing the election mechanism with these contracts is a new idea to make politicians more accountable. Two types of incentive contracts are considered: a) monetary incentive contracts which reward the politician in case of a successful reelection; b) reelection threshold contracts which mean that a politician should only have the right to stand for reelection if he has fulfilled certain requirements during his term of office. The results suggest that both types of incentive contracts can help to enhance the accountability of politicians and to increase social welfare.

Level thesis:degree_level

thesis.doctoral

Grantor dc:publisher

Universität Heidelberg

Year

2003

Author dc:creator

• Liessem, Verena

Contributors dc:contributor

• Gersbach, Hans

Repository record source_url

http://www.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/archiv/3837

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de:3837