{"id":{"repo_id":"heid-diss","oai_identifier":"oai:archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de:3837"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/heid-diss/oai:archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de:3837","repository":{"repo_id":"heid-diss","name":"Universität Heidelberg","base_url":"http://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver/cgi/oai2"},"display":{"title":"Incentive Contracts for Politicians","abstract":"The thesis studies the potential of incentive contracts for politicians using game-theoretic methods. Supplementing the election mechanism with these contracts is a new idea to make politicians more accountable. Two types of incentive contracts are considered: a) monetary incentive contracts which reward the politician in case of a successful reelection; b) reelection threshold contracts which mean that a politician should only have the right to stand for reelection if he has fulfilled certain requirements during his term of office. The results suggest that both types of incentive contracts can help to enhance the accountability of politicians and to increase social welfare.","abstract_html":"The thesis studies the potential of incentive contracts for politicians using game-theoretic methods. Supplementing the election mechanism with these contracts is a new idea to make politicians more accountable. Two types of incentive contracts are considered: a) monetary incentive contracts which reward the politician in case of a successful reelection; b) reelection threshold contracts which mean that a politician should only have the right to stand for reelection if he has fulfilled certain requirements during his term of office. The results suggest that both types of incentive contracts can help to enhance the accountability of politicians and to increase social welfare.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Liessem, Verena"],"institution":"Universität Heidelberg","degree_name":null,"degree_level":"thesis.doctoral","degree_discipline":null,"degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":["Gersbach, Hans"],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2003,"date_issued":"2003-07-21","date_published":"2003-07-21","updated_at":"2026-07-24T02:29:42Z","subjects":[],"languages":[],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"http://www.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/archiv/3837","outbound_label":"Repository record","outbound_source":"source_url"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor","label":"Contributor","values":["Gersbach, Hans"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Liessem, Verena"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:publisher","label":"Institution","values":["Universitätsbibliothek Heidelberg"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["doctoralThesis"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["thesis.doctoral"]},{"key":"thesis:institution_name","label":"Thesis Institution Name","values":["Universität Heidelberg"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["The thesis studies the potential of incentive contracts for politicians using game-theoretic methods. Supplementing the election mechanism with these contracts is a new idea to make politicians more accountable. Two types of incentive contracts are considered: a) monetary incentive contracts which reward the politician in case of a successful reelection; b) reelection threshold contracts which mean that a politician should only have the right to stand for reelection if he has fulfilled certain requirements during his term of office. The results suggest that both types of incentive contracts can help to enhance the accountability of politicians and to increase social welfare.","Die Dissertation untersucht mit spieltheoretischen Methoden das Potential von Anreizverträgen für Politiker. Diese Verträge sollen die durch die Wahl ausgeübte Kontrolle der Politiker unterstützen. Es werden zwei Arten von Anreizverträgen betrachtet: a) monetäre Anreizverträge, die den Politiker belohnen, falls er wiedergewählt wurde; b) Schwellenverträge, die das Recht eines Politikers, sich zur Wiederwahl stellen zu dürfen, an bestimmte Bedingungen koppeln, die der Politiker während seiner Amtszeit erfüllen muss. Die Dissertation zeigt, dass beide Arten von Anreizverträgen die soziale Wohlfahrt steigern können."]},{"key":"dc:format.medium","label":"Dc Format Medium","values":["application/pdf"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Incentive Contracts for Politicians","Anreizverträge für Politiker"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor":["Gersbach, Hans"],"dc:creator":["Liessem, Verena"],"dc:description.abstract":["The thesis studies the potential of incentive contracts for politicians using game-theoretic methods. Supplementing the election mechanism with these contracts is a new idea to make politicians more accountable. Two types of incentive contracts are considered: a) monetary incentive contracts which reward the politician in case of a successful reelection; b) reelection threshold contracts which mean that a politician should only have the right to stand for reelection if he has fulfilled certain requirements during his term of office. The results suggest that both types of incentive contracts can help to enhance the accountability of politicians and to increase social welfare.","Die Dissertation untersucht mit spieltheoretischen Methoden das Potential von Anreizverträgen für Politiker. Diese Verträge sollen die durch die Wahl ausgeübte Kontrolle der Politiker unterstützen. Es werden zwei Arten von Anreizverträgen betrachtet: a) monetäre Anreizverträge, die den Politiker belohnen, falls er wiedergewählt wurde; b) Schwellenverträge, die das Recht eines Politikers, sich zur Wiederwahl stellen zu dürfen, an bestimmte Bedingungen koppeln, die der Politiker während seiner Amtszeit erfüllen muss. Die Dissertation zeigt, dass beide Arten von Anreizverträgen die soziale Wohlfahrt steigern können."],"dc:format.medium":["application/pdf"],"dc:publisher":["Universitätsbibliothek Heidelberg"],"dc:title":["Incentive Contracts for Politicians","Anreizverträge für Politiker"],"dc:type":["doctoralThesis"],"thesis:degree_level":["thesis.doctoral"],"thesis:institution_name":["Universität Heidelberg"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-24T02:29:42Z"}