The Ontology of Not-Being in Aristotle and His Predecessors

<p>Aristotle is not thought to have a theory of not-being, but, in this project, I show that there are several distinct ways of not-being established in his writings. As being is said according to what is in-itself, what is accidentally, what is true, and what is actualized, so not-being is determined as the privative, the false, or potentiality. In each of these cases, I articulate what it means that it is a way of not-being, and how it is also a way of being. Aristotle’s theory is put in contrast to his predecessors, especially Parmenides and Plato, whose ontologies are centered around either denying not-being any status or making it into a first principle.</p>

Name thesis:degree_name

PhD

Level thesis:degree_level

Immediate Access

Discipline thesis:degree_discipline

Philosophy

Year dc:date.available

2020

Author dc:creator

• Greenstine, Abraham Jacob

Contributors dc:contributor

• Ronald Polansky
• Patrick Miller
• Walter Brogan

• Aristotle
• Plato
• Parmenides
• Ontology
• Not-Being
• Being
• Potentiality
• Falsity
• Privation
• History of Philosophy

Language dc:language

English

Repository record dc:identifier

https://dsc.duq.edu/etd/1912

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:dsc.duq.edu:etd-2925