{"id":{"repo_id":"duquesne","oai_identifier":"oai:dsc.duq.edu:etd-2925"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/duquesne/oai:dsc.duq.edu:etd-2925","repository":{"repo_id":"duquesne","name":"Duquesne","base_url":"https://dsc.duq.edu/do/oai/"},"display":{"title":"The Ontology of Not-Being in Aristotle and His Predecessors","abstract":"<p>Aristotle is not thought to have a theory of not-being, but, in this project, I show that there are several distinct ways of not-being established in his writings. As being is said according to what is in-itself, what is accidentally, what is true, and what is actualized, so not-being is determined as the privative, the false, or potentiality. In each of these cases, I articulate what it means that it is a way of not-being, and how it is also a way of being. Aristotle’s theory is put in contrast to his predecessors, especially Parmenides and Plato, whose ontologies are centered around either denying not-being any status or making it into a first principle.</p>","abstract_html":"&lt;p&gt;Aristotle is not thought to have a theory of not-being, but, in this project, I show that there are several distinct ways of not-being established in his writings. As being is said according to what is in-itself, what is accidentally, what is true, and what is actualized, so not-being is determined as the privative, the false, or potentiality. In each of these cases, I articulate what it means that it is a way of not-being, and how it is also a way of being. Aristotle’s theory is put in contrast to his predecessors, especially Parmenides and Plato, whose ontologies are centered around either denying not-being any status or making it into a first principle.&lt;/p&gt;","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Greenstine, Abraham Jacob"],"institution":null,"degree_name":"PhD","degree_level":"Immediate Access","degree_discipline":"Philosophy","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":["Ronald Polansky","Patrick Miller","Walter Brogan"],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2020,"date_issued":"2020-08-08T07:00:00Z","date_published":"2020-08-08T07:00:00Z","updated_at":"2026-07-24T02:10:58Z","subjects":["Aristotle","Plato","Parmenides","Ontology","Not-Being","Being","Potentiality","Falsity","Privation","History of Philosophy"],"languages":["English"],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://dsc.duq.edu/etd/1912","outbound_label":"Repository record","outbound_source":"dc:identifier"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor","label":"Contributor","values":["Ronald Polansky","Patrick Miller","Walter Brogan"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Greenstine, Abraham Jacob"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date.available","label":"Dc Date Available","values":["2020-07-07T07:00:00Z"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Philosophy"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["Immediate Access"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["PhD"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Aristotle","Plato","Parmenides","Ontology","Not-Being","Being","Potentiality","Falsity","Privation","History of Philosophy"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language","label":"Dc Language","values":["English"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["https://dsc.duq.edu/etd/1912"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["<p>Aristotle is not thought to have a theory of not-being, but, in this project, I show that there are several distinct ways of not-being established in his writings. As being is said according to what is in-itself, what is accidentally, what is true, and what is actualized, so not-being is determined as the privative, the false, or potentiality. In each of these cases, I articulate what it means that it is a way of not-being, and how it is also a way of being. Aristotle’s theory is put in contrast to his predecessors, especially Parmenides and Plato, whose ontologies are centered around either denying not-being any status or making it into a first principle.</p>"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["The Ontology of Not-Being in Aristotle and His Predecessors"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor":["Ronald Polansky","Patrick Miller","Walter Brogan"],"dc:creator":["Greenstine, Abraham Jacob"],"dc:date.available":["2020-07-07T07:00:00Z"],"dc:description.abstract":["<p>Aristotle is not thought to have a theory of not-being, but, in this project, I show that there are several distinct ways of not-being established in his writings. As being is said according to what is in-itself, what is accidentally, what is true, and what is actualized, so not-being is determined as the privative, the false, or potentiality. In each of these cases, I articulate what it means that it is a way of not-being, and how it is also a way of being. Aristotle’s theory is put in contrast to his predecessors, especially Parmenides and Plato, whose ontologies are centered around either denying not-being any status or making it into a first principle.</p>"],"dc:identifier":["https://dsc.duq.edu/etd/1912"],"dc:language":["English"],"dc:subject":["Aristotle","Plato","Parmenides","Ontology","Not-Being","Being","Potentiality","Falsity","Privation","History of Philosophy"],"dc:title":["The Ontology of Not-Being in Aristotle and His Predecessors"],"thesis:degree_discipline":["Philosophy"],"thesis:degree_level":["Immediate Access"],"thesis:degree_name":["PhD"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-24T02:10:58Z"}